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Ratios and Controls
B Y RICHARD H . GROSSE
P A R T N E R , PITTSBURGH

OFFICE

Presented before the Pennsylvania Industrial Bankers
Association, Bedford, Pennsylvania — April,
1955

In January of this year your President sent to you a letter report
setting forth certain " S m a l l Loan R a t i o s " which were prepared by the
statisticians, under the direction of M r . E l m e r E . Schmus, V i c e - P r e s i dent and Cashier, of The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago. Your C h a i r man of Meetings has asked me to discuss the significance and importance of these ratios with respect to operating a s m a l l loan business.
You w i l l note that I have captioned my talk "Ratios and Controls."
When I learned that I was to talk for at least an hour I suggested that
I be permitted to expand my discussion to include the following:
1. The various types of defalcations or irregularities
occur in your business.

which

2. The accounting procedures, reports, and systems of internal
control which help to prevent such irregularities.
3. Various auditing techniques which detect irregularities.
I am sure that you w i l l see that I w i l l not be discussing two separate and unrelated topics, because certain ratios, if properly used, can
become a very effective tool for management in controlling the operations of a s m a l l loan business.
RATIOS
During the course of our work with various clients engaged in
manufacturing and selling, we are sometimes asked questions along this
line - How does our overhead compare with other companies? A r e our
selling and general administrative expenses in line with other companies? Is our gross profit ratio about right? Although these questions
may not appear to be unreasonable, after a little deliberation it becomes
obvious that average percentages o r composite ratios can be misleading.
F o r example, sales policies may differ widely in that one company may
s e l l its products directly to its customers whereas another company
may operate through distributors. One company may be using the latest
equipment and methods whereas the equipment and methods of another
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company may be c l a s s i f i e d as antiquated. Advertising expenditures may
be budgeted on entirely different philosophies. And, of course, accounting policies could differ substantially in that one company may
value its inventories on the Lifo basis and the other on the Fifo basis.
The point I am making i s that in comparing percentages and ratios
misleading inferences can be drawn if like i s not compared with like, or
the bases on which the ratios were computed are different.
The ratios we are going to discuss today, however, have one d i s tinct advantage - basically, we are going to compare like with like.
Whether you operate one office or a s e r i e s of offices the method of
operation is fundamentally the same. The figures used in computing the
ratios were compiled by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago f r o m audit
reports and supplemental information furnished in questionnaires. The
figures are those of the national companies, the s o - c a l l e d regional
companies, and certain of the independents. Since these companies
enjoy a major portion of the total volume it is believed the composite
ratios reflect the trend of the industry as a whole.
A s I stated before, certain ratios if properly used can become an
effective tool of control. The letter sent to you in January contained 38
ratios. T i m e w i l l not permit a thorough discussion of a l l these ratios
so I have selected those ratios which should be watched and studied in
connection with your daily operations. This does not mean that we
should concern ourselves with these ratios only once or twice a year
when they appear in the annual or semi-annual reports to your stockholders.
We realize, of course, that in order to compute, ratios it i s necessary to have reliable figures readily available. Many companies do not
bother computing current ratios because of the amount of work involved
in accumulating figures with which to make such computations. Much of
this unnecessary work can be avoided if we w i l l give a little thought to
the daily, weekly, and monthly reports prepared at each loan office.
If you are operating, say, ten loan offices, you should concern
yourself not only with the ratios of the business as a whole but with the
operations of each office. F o r example, if the percentage of loss to
average notes outstanding for a l l offices is 1.90 but one of the offices
shows a percentage of 2.40 you have been warned that this particular
office requires immediate attention. L a t e r in my talk I w i l l discuss an
actual case on this point that resulted in discovering a defalcation of
sizable amount.
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In order to obtain full benefit f r o m any ratio or percentage, I suggest that wherever possible, the following comparisons should be made:
(a) Compare the ratio of each office for the month with the c o m bined ratio of a l l your offices for the month.
(b) Compare this month with last month.
(c) Compare this month with the same month a year ago.
(d) Make the same comparisons shown in a, b, and c above on a
cumulative basis.
(e) Compare each year with previous years.
(f) Where national, regional, or state ratios are available, c o m pare your results with these.
Obviously, if after computing these ratios you merely file them in
the bottom drawer of your desk they w i l l serve no useful purpose. On
the other hand, if a certain office or your business as a whole does not
measure up you are in a position to take the necessary steps to correct
deficiencies.
You are probably aware that many trade associations gather f i g ures and statistics from their members for the purpose of making
available to each member vital information regarding the operations of
that particular industry. If the Pennsylvania Industrial Bankers A s sociation i s not doing this I wonder if you are not overlooking an opportunity of increasing the value of membership.
Now, let us discuss those ratios which w i l l help us in controlling
our daily operations. Throughout these discussions my reference to
ratio numbers w i l l be those used by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago.
Aggregate Average Outstandings
of Loan Receivables (4)
Aggregate Average Monthly Cash
Collections (5)
% Average Monthly Cash P r i n c i p a l
Collections to Average
Outstandings (6)
What we are attempting to determine here i s what is sometimes
r e f e r r e d to as the Collection Factor, or the ratio of cash principal c o l lections to outstandings. The aggregate average outstandings of loan
receivables (No. 4) is determined by taking the final monthly t r i a l
balance figures of outstandings for each of the twelve months and d i viding by twelve. In a r r i v i n g at the aggregate average monthly cash
collections (No. 5) we exclude a l l renewal paper inasmuch as we are
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only concerned with cash principal receipts. Dividing the results obtained in No. 5 by No. 4 we obtain the ratio of average monthly cash
principal collections to average outstandings, or No. 6.
Admittedly, this ratio i s a very general one, which averages out
seasonal swings, but it certainly is less cumbersome to compute than
attempting to analyze and accumulate actual monthly maturities. It is
interesting in studying this ratio to compare it with the average amount
of individual loan balances, and the average amount of individual loans
made for the years ended December 31, 1948, 1953, and 1954:
Y e a r Ended December 31,
1948
1953
1954
% average monthly cash principal c o l lections to average outstandings
Average amount of individual loan balances.
Average amount of individual loans made. .

8.93%

7.35%

6.99%

$187
$236

$245
$296

$251
$305

Perhaps the largest contributing factor to the above trend is that
since 1948 the average borrower obtains a larger loan and pays it off
over a longer period. This, of course, bears out the general economy
of the nation in that the average borrower today has a greater income
and a higher standard of living. Once again it should be remembered
that we are studying composite averages and different areas may show
quite a variation f r o m these averages.
Past Due Accounts (13)
Let us assume that the assignment of No. 13 to this ratio has no
particular significance. F o r many years s m a l l loan companies have
classified their past due accounts as follows:
(a) 90 day accounts - those accounts on which no collections of
any kind have been received for 90 days or more.
(b) 60-89 day accounts - those accounts on which no collections
of any kind have been received for 60 to 89 days.
(c) "interest only" accounts - those accounts on which interest
and charges only were received in the last 60 days of the
period.
Experience has shown that due to the nature of the s m a l l loan
business the above classification of analyzing past due accounts i s the
most realistic. A s we a l l know, even the borrower with the best of i n tentions may have temporary difficulties which prevent him f r o m complying with the original terms of his loan. In other words, the most
practical approach in measuring delinquent accounts i s to classify and
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summarize them on the basis of activity in the accounts - - which, of
course, means recent payments.
Not only does this ratio give an indication of the efficiency of an
office but later in my discussion I w i l l demonstrate how a defalcation
was brought to light due to the improper handling of a monthly delinquent report.
Once again, let us study the trend of past due accounts by observing the following composite ratios:
Ratio To Outstanding
Receivables
December 31
1949
1953
1954
90 day accounts
. . . .
1.07%
1.61% 2.12%
60-89 day accounts . . .
1.39%
1.38% 1.37%
"Interest only" accounts
1.80%
1.46% 1.52%
It appears that the foregoing percentages show a trend in the right
direction in that the percentage of "interest only" accounts is on a declining scale.
% L o s s Reserves to Notes
Outstanding (16)
% L o s s to Average Notes
Outstanding (17)
% Recovery on Loans
Charged Off (18)
% Loans Renewed With Increases of Unpaid
Balances (19)
% Loans Renewed Without
Increases of Unpaid
Balances (20)
These ratios a l l belong to the same family and in order to get a
complete picture we cannot discuss one ratio without considering a l l the
others. And, of course, we should never lose sight of the definite connecting link between Past Due Accounts (No. 13) and actual write-offs
and losses.
Ratio No. 16 - % of loss reserves to notes outstanding-is determined by dividing the balances in the reserve for losses by the total
note balances outstanding as of the same date. Sometimes questions
are asked along this line - How much reserve should be set up? Why
does Company A show a reserve ratio of 8% whereas Company B's r e 231

serve i s only 2% of the receivables outstanding? The reserve balance
published by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago shows a composite
percentage of 3.61% at December 31, 1953 and 3.68% at December 31,
1954. Being a composite percentage it i s obvious that some companies
included in the study at December 31, 1954 had a ratio of more than
3.68% and some companies c a r r i e d a reserve of l e s s than 3.68%. The
company that has been in business for a long time w i l l , of course, have
the advantage of past experience. But past experience is not the only
factor to be considered in determining the adequacy of a reserve for
losses. In determining the adequacy of the reserve for losses at any
particular date each of the following factors must be seriously considered:
(a) The company's past experience on losses and recoveries.
(b) Conservatism of the company's policy in writing off doubtful
accounts.
(c) The condition of the loan balances which is based on an a c curate and r e a l i s t i c aging schedule.
(d) General economic conditions.
If you operate more than one office, each office should be analyzed
separately. The manager of one office may be more efficient than another not only in making better loans in the f i r s t place but in following
up on subsequent collections. A strike in a one-industry town would
certainly show a much different picture than the town that has several
industries and no strikes.
You are probably aware that there are two methods of handling
losses for federal income tax purposes. The charge-off basis permits
you to take as a deduction a l l balances written off during the year, less
a l l collections on accounts previously written off. On the reserve basis
you are permitted to take as a deduction a reasonable addition to the
reserve each year. But don't think you can reduce your Federal income
taxes by taking as a deduction an unreasonable addition to your reserve
for losses. The revenue agent examining your return w i l l apply the
same factors I have just enumerated in considering the reasonableness
of your reserve for losses. And it may cost you more than just the interest
on a tax deficiency. In a recent case, the revenue agent took the p o s i tion that the additions to the reserve for losses during 1951, 1952, and
1953 were excessive. The statute of limitations had run on the year
1951 so that the excessive provision had to be restored to income in the
open years. Unfortunately, in this particular case, the tax rate for 1951
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was only 28-3/4% whereas both 1952 and 1953 were excess-profits
years involving tax rates of 82%. Of course, one way of minimizing the
grief and w o r r y of wondering whether your tax return w i l l be accepted
as filed is to set up in your books for financial statement purposes a
r e a l i s t i c reserve for losses on the basis I have mentioned, but for tax
purposes deduct the accounts actually written off less recoveries on
accounts previously written off.
It should be remembered that Ratio No. 17 - % of losses to r e ceivables - represents the ratio of the actual balances written off to the
average notes outstanding.
Ratio No. 18 - % recovery on loans charged off - represents the
ratio of recoveries during the year to the total of accounts charged off
during the year. Recoveries include amounts collected on accounts
charged off during the year as well as recoveries on accounts charged off
in previous years. It i s interesting to observe that The F i r s t National
Bank of Chicago notes that the percentage of recovery on loans charged
off reflects the company's charge-off policies, for if recoveries are
meager it i s apparent that loans are not charged off until they are p r a c tically hopeless. It could, of course, mean that there is a lack of v i g orous collection effort or that the balances include bogus loans.
The trend of losses can be easily observed f r o m the following
tabulation of composite percentages:
1948
1953
1954
Ratio of loss reserves to notes outstanding (16). . .

. 4.60%

3.61%

3.

Ratio of losses (balances charged off) to
average notes outstanding (17)
1.59%
1.90%
1.
Ratio of recoveries to balances charged off
during the year (18)
30.07%
21.90%
18.71%
F o r the year ended December 31, 1954 the ratio of loans renewed
with increases of unpaid balances (Ratio No. 19) to total loans was
70.95%, whereas the ratio of loans renewed without increases of unpaid
balances (Ratio No. 20) to total loans was only .59%. These percentages
once again are based on statistics furnished to The F i r s t National Bank
of Chicago. These ratios are of importance in appraising the grade of
renewal paper c a r r i e d by a company. The interpretation made i s
that when an additional advance is made in the renewal of a loan, the
company usually i s satisfied with the credit r i s k of the borrower. Conversely, if the renewal is made without an increase of the unpaid b a l 233

ance, it usually signifies that the terms of the original loan were not
being met and that it became necessary to readjust such terms.
Ratios (21) to (38)
The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago states that Ratios (21) to (38),
inclusive, are statistical in character but that they have considerable
value in indicating trends in the business. L e t us compare some of the
ratios relating to profits and expenses:
Year Ended December 31
1948
1953
1954
total expense (including taxes) to gross
) gross income to total loans and purchases
(30)
, net profit to total loans and purchases
(31)
expense to total loans and purchases (32)
net profit to average net worth (33). . . .

76.49

86.31

85.08

13.50

15.31

16.44

3.16
10.34

2.15
13.16

2.40
14.04
13.10
13.39
20.15
It i s quite clear f r o m the foregoing that the cost of doing business,
which includes taxes, has steadily climbed higher; or stating it another
way, the net profit ratio (i.e., ratio of net profit to gross earned.interest, etc.) has decreased from 23.51% for 1948 to 13.69% for 1953 and
14.92% for 1954.
CONTROLS
A s I pointed out at the beginning of my talk certain ratios, if properly used, can become a very effective tool for management in controlling the operations of a s m a l l loan business. However, we must recognize at a l l times that this is only one method of controlling operations
and detecting i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .
In order to prevent irregularities it is necessary that every b u s i ness have a good system of internal control. How often you have heard
this statement made. But in too many cases we hear the argument that
an office is too s m a l l and that it is impossible to have a good system
of internal control. E v e r y effort should be made to provide for an appropriate segregation of duties among employees. A l s o keep in mind
the desirability of rotating duties or employees. In assigning duties
always keep this rule in mind - No one employee should begin and c o m plete a transaction. The following are just a few examples of what we
mean by transactions:
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Requiring a witness other than the person making the loan.
Proceeds of a loan should be given to borrower by a person other
than the person closing the loan.
Credit verification to be made by person other than the one who
took the original application.
But most important, it is essential to make periodic checks to determine that the system as outlined is actually working.
By periodic checks I am not only referring to the annual or s e m i annual audits of your public accountants. You should provide systematic
procedures of testing and checking to be followed by your managers,
supervisors, and internal auditors. And if you are an officer of your
corporation you might give some thought to making surprise visits
yourself to your various offices throughout the year.
Rather than speak in generalities I should like to devote the r e mainder of my talk to a discussion of actual cases of irregularities. A s
time permits I shall elaborate on those controls which help to prevent
irregularities and those auditing techniques which detect irregularities.
However, I should like to emphasize that independent audits frequently
bring i r r e g u l a r i t i e s to light, but because such audits are based on tests,
assurance is not complete that they w i l l do so. In any event the mere
citing of these cases should remind you that it could happen to you, and
how important it is to be fraud-minded at a l l times. Some of these
cases w i l l reveal a pitiful lack of fraud-sense.
These cases are based upon reports that have come to my attention during the past three years. F o r obvious reasons I have changed
the names and locations.
Case A - $1,000
The cashier had abstracted cash receipts from recorded collections and had prepared and recorded several deposit slips in the check
book but had not deposited the cash in the bank. Copies of the deposit
slips retained by the branch were not authenticated by the bank in a c cordance with the Company's instructions. The shortage was developed
in connection with a surprise verification of cash on hand and on deposit.
The previous examination of this office was made in November 1953 and
the irregularities took place in late M a r c h and early A p r i l 1954.
The cashier was released immediately after the irregularities
were discovered and she agreed to reimburse the Company for the
funds abstracted f r o m the collections. The Company's procedures have
now been changed to require each loan office to submit authenticated
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deposit slips in support of each deposit shown on the daily report to the
Executive Office, which i s in accordance with a recommendation made
in connection with the examination for the year ended A p r i l 30, 1953.
Case B - $85,000
A c l a i m in the amount of $85,000 has been filed with the Casualty
Company. However, it is believed that some portion of this amount cannot be proven as part of the loss because some of the alleged borrowers
cannot be located.
Ways in which defalcation was perpetrated:
a. Fictitious loans were placed on the records to substantiate
improper withdrawals.
b. The loan manager was purportedly working with an appliance
dealer to defraud the Company by delivering old or faulty
television sets instead of new ones.
Customers claimed that the sets were sent back and the
transaction canceled. However, the loans which financed
the transactions were not canceled.
In other instances customers believed the merchandise they
had received was on approval only and did not realize they
had signed loan papers.
In s t i l l other instances new sets were delivered, but when shop
repairs were needed old sets were exchanged for the new ones.
c. On at least one occasion two checks were drawn to reimburse
the office working funds for the same loans. The shortage
thus created was restored to the bank account on the same
day the public accountants started their examination.
d. P r e m i u m s for life insurance collected f r o m borrowers were
not recorded or disbursed to the insurance companies.
How the above facts were discovered:
The statistics at the Home Office indicated a declining rate of
interest was being collected at this office and a supervisor was
sent out to investigate.
Case C - $1,200
During the course of the examination of this office it was noted
by the auditor that loan office personnel had failed to include on the
monthly delinquent reports to headquarters nineteen accounts which
under Company policy were apparently delinquent for over three months.
Conversations by the auditor with the loan manager of ttie office failed
to develop any logical explanation as to the reasons for the omission of
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these accounts f r o m the report.

Another investigation was instituted.

T h i s investigation resulted in the determination that principal and
interest in connection with seven accounts aggregating $1,200 had been
improperly withheld by the loan manager, It was also noted that the
practice of withholding payments of principal and interest and the subsequent recording thereof and of changing dates of payment for the purpose of improving delinquency had apparently gone on for some time.
Case D - $4,500
The i r r e g u l a r i t y aggregated approximately $4,500, of which $3,600
represented collections on principal of instalments receivable and the
remainder represented collections of interest income.
The defaulter ( c a s h i e r - r e c o r d keeper) abstracted cash collections
over a two-year period. The amounts of cash abstracted were not entered in the cash receipts records and thus were not posted to the
general records, but the portion of the abstractions representing c o l lections on principal was credited to the detail receivable account
cards. Thus, an increasing "open" difference between the control a c count balance and the aggregate of the detail account card balances was
created. The existence of this open difference was "concealed" at the
times of the periodic taping (usually twice monthly) of the account card
balances by the defaulter, who participated in such periodic tapings,
through overstating the adding machine tape totals.
The existence of the open difference between the receivable cont r o l account balance and the aggregate of the detail account cards was
discovered by the auditors in connection with their examination of this
office. The defaulter had taped the cards a few days previously, which
taping had indicated that the detail cards were within a few dollars of
the control account. After the auditors accounted for a l l intervening
transactions between these two tapes, they refooted the Company's tapes
of the e a r l i e r date and ascertained that the total was overstated $3,600.
Confronted with these facts by the regional manager, together
with the fact that e a r l i e r tapes had been found to have been overfooted,
the defaulter confessed.
The regional manager of the office has been severely c r i t i c i z e d
by the Company for not discovering the matter e a r l i e r as he was r e sponsible for taping the cards every four months, but has admitted that
he merely compared account cards with tapes run by the loan office
personnel without proving the accuracy of the tapes.
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Case E - $15,000
The amount of the shortage as finally determined was approximately $15,000 and was created over a period of approximately two
years.
Two methods were used by the person responsible for the shortage (secretary-cashier). The one most frequently used and which a c counted for the major part of the shortage was that of withholding payments, principally full balance payments where accounts were paid off
p r i o r to their maturity. The second method which was used was in
making fake loans. In a l l , there were approximately 150 items involved.
Withholding of payments each month ranged f r o m an aggregate of $45 in
the lowest month to $1,900 in the highest month.
The shortage was concealed in the following manner:
When payments were made by customers and withheld, receipts
were issued to the customers and their passbooks credited in
the usual way. In many instances the payment was also
credited on the account card but in no case was it entered in
the cash records.
In order to avoid excessive tape shortage, fake ledger cards
were prepared and inserted in the files. These fake cards
were credited f r o m time to time with fictitious payments to
prevent their becoming delinquent and to prevent investigation.
The person responsible for the shortage also made it a point
to run the periodic tapes herself and to force the balance to
a r r i v e at a s m a l l difference. When auditors a r r i v e d and ran
the tapes she was able to insert sufficient fake cards in the
files to cover the shortages.
The most important part of her plan to cover the shortage was
the creation of deliberate confusion and disorder in the records
so that no one could ever t e l l exactly what was going on.
It was her practice to make erroneous entries in the records
with later erroneous corrections, to alter and change the
records in a confused manner, to lose o r misplace legitimate
account records, etc.
The tapes had not balanced with the control accounts for about
three years.
Failure of the cash drawers to balance daily was a common
occurrence.
Cards and documents on accounts were frequently missing.
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The loan manager, field supervisor, and field auditors were a l l
aware of this situation but no steps were ever taken to investigate it
thoroughly or to correct it. It was always explained as being the
result of a rapid turnover in personnel and an inability to obtain competent employees in this area.
The shortage was finally developed as a result of an audit by a
field auditor. The tape of the accounts which the auditor prepared was
short of the control account. In checking the difference the auditor had
the loan manager c a l l the cards to him and in doing so the manager
noted a number of cards for accounts with which he was not familiar.
Further, it appeared that the cards were typed on a machine that was
different f r o m machines used in the office. Investigation of these cards
disclosed the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . Because of complications involved it took
several months to investigate the shortage.
The final report issued by the auditor who conducted the investigation placed most of the blame on poor supervision and poor local
management. His report also indicated that he felt that the field auditors, who had been assigned by the internal audit department, were
either incompetent or inexperienced.
Case F - $5,500
The i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were perpetrated during an eighteen-month
period and involved twelve of the loan office's outstanding loan accounts.
Ten of such irregularities represented bogus loans as to which
the defaulter prepared fictitious loan documents and one represented a
bogus loan as to which a relative signed the loan documents as a "favor"
to the defaulter. In each of such eleven instances the defaulter endorsed
the name of the alleged borrower on the checks for the loan proceeds
and cashed the checks at the loan office. The twelfth irregularity
represented an abstraction of a collection on a loan account for the
balance thereof, $42.50.
The i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were concealed (1) as to certain of the bogus
loans by regular payments thereon by the defaulter so that they escaped
attention as delinquent items and (2) as to the remainder of the bogus
loans (as to which payments were delinquent) by improperly classifying
the related account cards as current, or withholding the account cards
f r o m the files between t r i a l balances of the loan accounts.
The i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were discovered by two of the Company's r e gional managers in connection with their periodic balancing of the loan
office's detail account cards with the control account. The adding m a 239

chine tape of the detail account cards run by the regional managers was
short of the control account and investigation of this shortage revealed
certain of the account cards applicable to the bogus loans "hidden" in
a f i l i n g cabinet not used for account cards. The defaulter divulged the
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s upon being confronted with the "hidden" account cards.
Case G - $49,000
The assistant manager of this office had made 115 bogus loans.
The loans were supported by documents which apparently bore a l l of
the characteristics of regular loan documents. Disbursements for the
loans were made in a l l cases by Company check, signed in most i n stances by the defaulter, and cashed in most instances at the loan office.
The checks were endorsed with the names of the payees and the endorsements were apparently a l l in different handwritings. Amounts
taken ranged f r o m $100 to $800 a loan and f r o m $400 a month to $9,000.
The irregularity was concealed over a long period of time (about
a year) because a l l of the records and documents surrounding the transactions bore the normal evidences of regularity. In the case of the
older loans, payments were made and recorded in the accounts so that
they escaped attention as delinquent items.
The irregularity was discovered when the defaulter was on vacation and another employee was unable to locate one of the " b o r r o w e r s " .
It is interesting to note the following with respect to the account
cards and "loan documents" pertaining to the bogus loans:
1. F o r the most part, " c o l l e c t i o n s " on the " l o a n s " were recorded
considerably after their due dates. Delinquencies in excess
of two months were not unusual.
2. Only one of the " l o a n s " showed evidence of having been r e financed by the Company.
3. Numerous collections of insufficient amount (less than the
monthly payments called for by the related " p r o m i s s o r y
notes") were noted to have been recorded on the account
cards.
4. Several instances were noted in which payments of two or
three instalments were recorded as collected on the same
day for the same " l o a n " .
5. Handwritten notes on some of the cards indicated that " l o a n s "
had been classified as current at times when they were delinquent.
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6. The collection effort record on the reverse of the account
cards reflected contacts with " b o r r o w e r s " by only one e m ployee, the defaulter. Comments on "collection effort" were
in considerable detail and contained plausible explanations
of the "borrowers' "financial condition and ability to continue
"payments" on the account.
Case H - $24,000
The losses represent uncollectible loans of sizable amounts which
were made on collateral that (a) was non-existent, (b) was subject to
other liens, o r (c) was substantially over-valued. These loans were
made by a branch manager and branch cashier in collusion with a usedautomobile dealer and a furniture dealer.
Concealment of the shortages was effected as follows:
(a) The loans were supported by notes, chattel mortgages, and
other documentary evidence of the same nature as that used
for other loans. A s long as the loans were in a " c u r r e n t "
status, the accounting records as regularly maintained in the
branch indicated no evidence that they were not bona fide.
(b) When the loans became delinquent, they were included in the
category of current loans in reports to the executive office.
This prevented discovery by executive office officials who
reviewed the reports, because the total of the delinquent
loans as reported did not appear to be abnormal.
(c) The branch office i s subjected to periodical visits by a C o m pany regional manager. This employee is supposed to review
a l l of the loan records. Upon his visits the records relating
to these loans were withheld f r o m him. The regional manager failed to balance the loan cards, although this was one of
his duties to be performed on a loan-office visit. Consequently, he did not know that cards were being withheld.
These loans could not be concealed when the branch manager took
his vacation and they were discovered by the regional manager. Upon
their discovery the regional manager demanded an explanation of the
branch manager who stated that the loans resulted f r o m bad judgement
on his part and represented ordinary bad debt losses. He stated that he
had concealed the delinquencies on the statistical reports because he
feared that disclosure would result in his discharge for "bad judgement"
in making loans. The regional manager, after an investigation, approved
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the write-offs of the loans as bad debts and reported the losses to have
resulted from bad judgment.
The discovery of the elements of fraud in the documents s u r rounding these transactions was made by the auditor in charge of the
audit of the branch office. In performing a routine program operation
he became aware of the large amount of the "bad debt" losses suffered
by this office during the year under audit. He also was informed by
Company employees that Company supervisory personnel had investigated the losses and had approved the " c h a r g e - o f f s " as resulting from
"bad judgment" on the part of the branch manager in extending credit.
He noted that reports to this effect had been filed by a Company regional
manager and that the approvals of the "charge-offs" had been duly given.
However, he worked for three evenings until midnight examining the
document files before he discovered the forged documents and evidence
that the manager must have been aware of the collateral insufficiency.
One becomes concerned with the implications contained in this
irregularity. F i r s t , it has demonstrated that large amounts of money
can be diverted from a s m a l l loan office over a long period of time by
an employee acting in collusion with outsiders. Second, it showed that
review and investigation by a Company supervisor was ineffective.
Case I - $5,800
The embezzlement was perpetrated through the recording on the
books of bogus loans in the names of friends or former neighbors of
the embezzler and in the names of apparently non-existent persons.
The procedure employed in perpetrating the irregularities involved the
obtaining of cash advances from the cashiers "to close loans after office
hours" for which loan documents were turned over to the cashiers on
the following morning.
Concealment of the irregularities was attempted through the
recording of " c o l l e c t i o n s " on the bogus loans (presumably f r o m the
proceeds of other bogus loans) and through the making of collection
effort notations on the office records of such bogus loans in disguised
handwritings indicating contacts with the " b o r r o w e r s " . (The use of d i s guised handwritings in connection with such notations appears to have
been a very ingenious device, inasmuch as the appearance of more than
one handwriting in the collection effort notations is usually considered
to be evidence that more than one person has had contact with a "borrower", giving the impression that such loan was "regular").
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The irregularities were discovered by another of the Company's
employees when he attempted to contact two of the non-existent borrowers during the vacation of the embezzler.
Case J - $9,000
The irregularities involve collusion between a used car dealer and
the manager of a s m a l l office (who, the Company believes, were
actually partners with respect to the used car operation) through the
making of loans f r o m Company funds in amounts far in excess of the
collateral value of the automobiles covered by the loans or, in certain
instances, on non-existent automobiles.
Such loans were made in the names of " f r i e n d s " of the used car
dealer. The Company holds sworn statements of most of such "friends"
to the effect that they admit signing the loan papers and automobile
titles as an accommodation to the used car dealer but that the proceeds
of the loans were turned over to the dealer.
Concealment was attempted by maintaining "collections" on such
loans on a relatively current basis, thus minimizing the possibility that
loan office collectors would contact the persons in whose names the
accounts were c a r r i e d by the loan office. Further, the documents e v i dencing automobile titles were withheld f r o m the loan office files thus
concealing the fact that the descriptions of the automobiles pledged as
collateral as shown by the loan office records did not agree with the
descriptions shown on the titles. (In general the loan office records
indicated that the automobiles were of more recent manufacture than
was actually the case, in order that the amounts of each loan might
appear to be in line with the value of the automobile).
The i r r e g u l a r i t i e s came to light upon investigation by the C o m pany's regional manager as to the reason for the absence f r o m the loan
folder of the document evidencing title to an automobile pledged as
collateral to one of the irregular loans.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing cases prove, among other things, the importance
of making a l l employees take regular vacations. Further, I cannot
over-emphasize the necessity for examinations of s m a l l loan companies
being on a surprise basis. I also wish to emphasize the necessity for
maintaining absolute control over the cash and the account cards until
a l l the operations that require such control have been completed. E x perience shows that two of the most important audit procedures that
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can be applied for the detection of irregularities in s m a l l loan offices
are (1) balancing details of the accounts against the controls, and (2)
test confirmation of the accounts. If the date of the examination is
known to the loan office employees in advance, or if control is lost,
even momentarily, the effectiveness of these two procedures may be
largely destroyed. And, of course; these cases have undoubtedly proved
the importance of being fraud-minded at a l l times.
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